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THE DEMISE OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOHN KUHN BLEIMAIER*
The field of international law has traditionally been divided into two
distinct areas, private international law and public international law. Pri-
vate international law concerns itself with the transnational problems en-
countered by individuals, defined to include corporations as well as natural
persons. This area embraces problems of international conflicts of law,
choice of law, and international immigration laws. Public international
law, in contrast, deals with the relationships between and among nation
states and embraces diplomatic law, consular law, and the law of war. At
the close of the Middle Ages, political units which began to evolve into
states came into contact with one another. This contact took the form of
commerce as well as war. Although individuals had maintained contacts
between countries, they did so as emissaries and representatives of their
respective sovereigns rather than in their private capacities. Thus, it has
been said that the individual is not the subject of traditional public inter-
national law.'
The body of public international law doctrine began to evolve in the
16th Century, when legal scholars and philosophers of law started to record
the developing conventions of international intercourse and expound on
the appropriate future development of this body of law.2 The macropoliti-
cal perspective of the earliest international lawyers is evidenced by the fact
that the area was originally called The Law of War and Peace.3 Public
* B.A., Columbia College; M.A., Columbia University School of International Affairs; J.D.,
St. John's University School of Law.
G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 139-55 (3d ed. 1957). Recently, treaties such as
the European Human Rights Convention have granted rights to individuals as subjects of
international law. R. BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE 5-7 (1973). The Charter of the
Organization of American States provides that "[elach state has the right to develop its
cultural, political and economic life freely and naturally. In this free development, the State
shall respect the rights of the individual and the principles of universal morality." Charter
of the Organization of American States, art. 13, [19511 2 U.S.T. 2419, T.I.A.S. No. 2361.
For further discussion of the role of the individual in international law see Eagleton, Some
Questions as to the Place of the Individual in the International Law of the Future, 37 AM. J.
INT'L L. 642 (1943); Korowicz, The Problem of the International Personality of Individuals,
50 Am. J. INT'L L. 533 (1956); Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 64 L.Q. REV.
97, 102-03 (1948).
2 Perhaps best known of the early scholars was Hugo Grotius whose De jure belli et pacis,
published in 1625, still remains one of the most important works in international law. In 1672
Samuel Pufendorf published De jure naturae et gentium, which expanded on the earlier work
of Grotius. This early thinking in international law was based largely on the Corpus Juris
Civilis of Justinian, A. D'ENTREvEs, NATURAL LAW 39 (1970), and is the underpinning of the
civil law prevalent on the European continent, J. CRAB, THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE 2-7 (1977).
This is illustrated by the title of Hugo Grotius' great work, De jure belli et pacis.
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international law grew up in a political environment dominated by the
monarchal form of government and in a philosophical climate thoroughly
imbued with the spirit and doctrine of natural law. The natural law con-
cept was the product of the great legal minds of the Church who believed
that there exists a body of divinely promulgated law supersedirig the will
and acts of men.' Thus, public international law had its genesis in an
environment dominated by the concept of the divine right of kings to rule
their people and in the concept that there exist fundamental laws estab-
lishing rights and wrongs which these sovereigns must observe in their
interaction with one another.
From the beginning of its development, private international law ex-
hibited an altogether different perspective. This body of law evolved at a
time of increasing individual mobility and expanding commercial inter-
course, which necessitated the development of laws to govern activities
having contacts with two or more political units. When a contract is made
between individuals from different legal systems, whose law is to apply?
This fundamental and practical question, in addition to numerous other
'issues, has been addressed by private international law.5 Of necessity,
private international law has been an extremely pragmatic area. Solutions
to choice of law and conflict of laws questions have been most heavily
influenced by the practical aspects of individual situations.' The choice of
law governing a contract must be made with a view toward commercial
reality and the possibility of enforcing judgments. Consequently, private
international law has developed in such a way as to stimulate mutually
beneficial international contact. Occasionally, this dictates sacrificing
principle for the exigencies of the moment!
See A. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW 38-58 (1970).
It has been said that "[pirivate international law is commonly called the conflict of laws.
It is an aspect of private law which involves such juridical relations between individuals as
transcend the sphere of national law and, therefore, is not international law in the true sense."
Phleger, Some Recent Developments in International Law of Interest to the United States,
30 DEP'T STATE BULL. 196 (1954).
1 Illustrative of the practical orientation of private international law is the choice of law rule
applicable to contracts:
Ordinarily, the federal courts determine which law governs a contract by "grouping
the contracts" or "finding the center of gravity" of the contract. The law of the jurisdic-
tion having the closest relation with the contract is selected because, it is felt, the
parties contracted probably with that law (if any law) in mind, and that jurisdiction
would probably have the greatest interest in defining the rights of the contracting
parties. This doctrine, however nebulous in its statement, seems to fulfill more ade-
quately the expectations of the parties than the definitively worded, but often artifi-
cally applied, doctrine of lex loci contractus.
Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (footnotes omitted). As a
general proposition, courts will respect the desire of the contracting parties to be governed
by the law of a particular jurisdiction. See, e.g., Overseas Trading Co., S.A. v. United States,
159 F. Supp. 382, 384 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
See, e.g., Aboitiz & Co. v. Price, 99 F. Supp. 602 (D. Utah 1951), where the court stated:
[W]e are free under international law to choose our own theories of conflict of laws,
and, that is particularly true, where the acts to which we refuse recognition are the
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Enforcement of judgments in the area of private international law has
been a subject of constant concern for all parties involved.' As the subjects
of private international law are either natural or legal persons, they are
amenable to the jurisdiction of at least one sovereign.9 If they are physi-
cally present in, or if their assets are located in, more than one state, the
individuals are potentially subject to the jurisdiction of several govern-
ments.1 0
Enforcement in the public international law area is quite a different
matter. There traditionally has not existed a central forum for the resolu-
tion of disputes between sovereigns. Thus, the rules of public international
law only had force to the extent that sovereigns felt themselves either as a
moral or as a practical matter bound to observe them. Early scholars,
however, were not troubled by the lack of centralized authority. It was
accepted that the sovereigns who were the subjects of public international
law ruled their respective states on the basis of divine right and in conform-
ity with divine authority. Thus, compliance with the precepts of public
international law on a regular basis was expected. This system functioned
tolerably well at the time that public international law emerged. The
sovereigns of the civilized world, which at that time was thought to encom-
pass basically only Europe and European dominions, were able to conform
their interaction to the precepts of public international law. Such conform-
ity may have been induced by the belief that it was the divinely ordained
duty of each sovereign to act in conformity with traditional public interna-
tional law or by the recognition that the rules of public international law
were the rules of the game and the offending player might be punished by
the other players.
The theory of the divine right of kings has been gradually whittled
acts of an enemy. Even neutral sovereign states enjoy considerable latitude in the
solution of their own conflict-in-law problems according to their own choice of law
theories. A fortiori, that is true of a sovereign which is an ally of the occupied state,
and which had as close a relationship to the Philippines as we had in 1942, in a war
against the common enemy. It must be remembered that in this decision we are
required to go back into war time relationships.
Id. at 623. See also Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 266 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897
(1934).
See G. CHESIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 629 (9th ed. 1974), wherein the author pointed
out:
If a plaintiff fails to obtain satisfaction of a judgment in the country where it has been
granted, the question arises whether it is enforceable in another country where the
defendant is found. It is clear. . . that owing to the principle of territorial sovereignty
a judgment delivered in one country cannot, in the absence of international agreement,
have a direct operation of its own force in another.
See H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 73, 75 (4th ed. E. Scoles 1964); G. STIMURG,
PRINcwPLsS OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 69-84 (3d ed. 1963).
," J. CASTEL, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 153-54 (1960) ("it is well-established . . . that
immovable property is exclusively subject to the law of the place it is situated."); id., at 233
("jurisdiction is territorial and attaches to all persons either permanently or temporarily
resident"); H. GOODICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 72-73 (4th ed. E. Scoles 1964).
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away, however, and it can fairly be said that monarchy now only exists by
the consent of the ruled." What is the role of public international law in a
world where sovereigns are not monarchs but governments composed of
many individuals and where principles of natural or divinely ordained law
have been superseded by legislation? The answer is that public interna-
tional law is waning. Its demise was foreshadowed by the age of national-
ism.
The most important manifestation of the spirit of nationalism in inter-
national affairs can be observed in the disregard for basic principles of
public international law in European relations with non-European peoples
and countries during the 19th Century. 2 With the dawning of the 20th
Century and the birth of the age of ideology, it became inevitable that the
final blow would be struck to the concept of public international law. The
conflagration of competing ideologies represented by different states made
it inevitable that the political units which are the subjects of public inter-
national law no longer would feel an obligation to deal with one another
in conformity with established rules of public international law.
Illustrative of the demise of public international law principles in the
face of an ideological divergence are the relations between the Soviet Union
and the German Third Reich. Treaties and understandings were entered
into by the parties with no intention on either side of living up to their
provisions.'3 Once hostilities between these two ideologically incompatible
countries commenced, the laws of war were not observed. 4 This is hardly
surprising, as both the Soviet Union and the German Third Reich viewed
each other as illegitimate and sought each other's complete destruction. 5
Public international law developed in an atmosphere where individual
sovereigns took for granted each other's basic rights and royal prerogatives;
it has declined in an era in which ideologies have sought to destroy each
other. The Nuremberg Trials which followed World War II were designed
to bolster public international law. The prosecution of war criminals was
based upon the existence of natural law precepts which had been violated
by the offenders. 6 As appeared during the course of the trials, however,
See S. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 177-91 (1968).
" See F. SCHUMAN, INTERNATIONAL PoLmcs 395-402 (7th ed. 1969). Professor Schuman
pointed out that new colonies often were acquired by the great powers during the 19th
Century through bloodshed. These wars, which usually involved "atrocities, abuses, . . . and
savage repression," id. at 402, were often claimed to be justified "in the name of humanity
and self-determination." Id. at 399.
11 Wheeler-Bennett, Twenty Years of Russo-German Relations, 1919-1939, 25 FOREIGN AFF.
23, 41-43 (1946).
14 M. BELGION, VICTOR'S JUSTICE 22-23, 43-50 (1949); P. CALVOCORESsI, NUREMH3URO 47-54
(1948).
" See Wheeler-Bennett, Twenty Years of Russo-German Relations, 1919-1939, 25 FOREIGN
AFF. 23 (1946).
The Nuremburg Trials were based on three separate classes of crimes. They were:
(a) crimes against peace, which means. . . planning, preparation, initiation or waging
of a war of aggression; (b) war crimes, by which term is meant mainly violation of the
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
flagrant violations of public international law and the precepts of natural
law also had been committed by the victors in World War f1.11 Since no
attempt to prosecute the victorious offenders was undertaken, the incident
gives rise to an impression that only the unsuccessful violator of public
international law is brought to justice.
In the post World War II world, public international law has not been
significantly rehabilitated. Treaties continue to be broken and renego-
tiated.' 8 Indeed, it is generally recognized that agreements between states
are merely a matter of publicity or public relations. Moreover, diplomats
in foreign states are harassed with either the tacit acquiescence or the
active complicity of host governments.'" Finally, the laws of war have come
to be viewed as obsolete or academic in the case of guerilla wars of national
liberation and in view of the technological possibility of total world annihi-
lation by nuclear war.
Although lip service to its basic dictates may still be paid in some
quarters, public international law is extinct. It was a historical phenome-
non and its time has passed. Where does this leave the international com-
munity today? Macropolitical relations are kept reasonably stable by what
has been called the "balance of terror." The fear of global conflict restrains
the great powers and prevents their ideological disdain for each other from
laws and customs of war; and (c) crimes against humanity, in particular murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population.
Wright, War Crimes Under International Law, 62 L.Q. REV. 40, 41 (1946). Such conduct
violates "that sense of right and wrong, of the instincts of justice and humanity which are
the common heritage of all civilized nations." Id. at 40.
'1 Among the war crimes alleged to have been committed by the Allies in the Second World
War are the murders of hostages, plunder of property, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of
war, and wanton destruction of cities. M. BELGION, VICTOR'S JUSTICE 95-117 (1949). Through-
out the Nuremburg Trials, the defendants repeatedly pointed out violations of international
law which they claimed were committed by the Allies. See J. APPLEMAN, MILITARY TRIBUNALS
AND INTERNATIONAL CmMas 73-76 (1954).
" Modem history contains many instances of a treaty violation being followed by renegotia-
tion. For example, the Treaty of Paris of 1856 was violated by Russia when the Russian fleet
entered the Black Sea. J. BmERLY, THE LAW OF NATIoNs 332-33 (6th ed. 1963). The treaty was
later renegotiated to provide for the presence of the Russian fleet in that body of water. Id.
at 333. This phenomena also has been observable in the post Second World War era. In fact,
modern international agreements often allow parties to renounce unilaterally their legal obli-
gations. See T. ELIAs, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 101-18 (1974). For example, the United
States, rather than breach an international air travel agreement, served notice, as provided
in the agreement, that in 6 months it would no longer consider itself bound by the terms of
the agreement. Press Release of Nov. 15, 1965 reprinted in 53 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 923. After a
renegotiation of the agreement, the notice was withdrawn. Press Release of May 14, 1966
reprinted in 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 956 (1966). See generally A. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY
TERMINATION 56-84 (1975).
"1 The United Nations has promulgated the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons. In the preamble of the convention it is
noted that "crimes against diplomatic agents and other internationally protected persons
jeopardizfe] the maintenance of normal international relations which are necessary for co-
operation among States." U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
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manifesting itself in active aggressiveness. Nonetheless, a general disre-
gard for the principles of public international law is demonstrated by the
hundreds of small "wars" and armed conflicts which have erupted around
the world in the last quarter century.
What remains of international law is its inauspicious "lesser half,"
private international law. As international trade and commerce have ex-
panded due to technological advances and the evolution of ever greater
international economic interdependence, the importance of private inter-
national law has increased. This discipline, with its historic pragmatism
and practical orientation, has survived the age of nationalism as well as
the present age of ideology. When trading partners are based in ideologi-
cally divergent political systems, they take account of this in their com-
mercial relations by providing for binding arbitration of disputes in a third
country where a fair adjudication is expected and where execution pur-
suant to the judgment is hopefully available. With the passing from the
scene of personal sovereigns, public international law has withered away.
In an age of economic interdependence of the international community,
private international law has come to ascendancy.
